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Essma: DEAD-Locked

NOTE
DEAD-Locked: Evaluating Judge-Imposed
Death Sentences Under Missouri’s Death
Penalty Statute
Michael J. Essma*

I. INTRODUCTION
On October 6, 2017, Judge Kelly Parker, a St. Charles County circuit
judge in Missouri, sentenced Marvin Rice to death for the murder of his
girlfriend, Annette Durham.1 Parker’s sentencing came in spite of eleven of
twelve jurors voting to sentence Rice to life imprisonment instead.2 The jury
found Rice guilty of first-degree murder for killing Durham and guilty of
second-degree murder for killing Durham’s boyfriend – Steven Strotkamp.3
With respect to the first-degree murder charge, the jury did not unanimously
decide whether Rice should be sentenced to life without parole or death.4 The
“deadlock” provision of Missouri’s death penalty scheme allows a judge to
make the ultimate determination of life or death when the jury cannot reach a
unanimous decision.5 Since all twelve members were not able to make a

* B.A., University of South Carolina-Columbia, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University of
Missouri School of Law, 2020; Senior Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review,
2019–2020. Thanks to Professor Paul Litton for his assistance throughout the writing
process and to the editors of the Missouri Law Review for their comments and
feedback during the writing and editing process. Finally, thanks to Brittany Briggs for
bringing this issue to my attention.
1. Robert Patrick, Judge in St. Charles County Sentences Former Dent County
Deputy to Death, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/judge-in-st-charles-countysentences-former-dent-county-deputy/article_2c1dbb19-0bc6-5022-8dc72d6540e61951.html [perma.cc/CMD7-UEUM].
2. Christine Byers, Jury Hung in Sentencing of Former Dent County Deputy
Found Guilty of Two Murders, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Aug. 13, 2017),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/jury-hung-in-sentencing-offormer-dent-county-deputy-found/article_bf3f30d1-60fb-5a54-80154e2148f8159a.html [perma.cc/ARH4-VHNT].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2018).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 11

272

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

determination, the jury deadlocked, and the decision was ultimately made by
Judge Parker.6
Marvin Rice’s case is not unique in Missouri. In 1994, Joseph Whitfield
was also sentenced to death by a judge after the jury voted eleven-to-one in
favor of life without parole.7 In fact, a jury has not sentenced anyone to death
in Missouri since 2013.8 Overall, Missouri judges have imposed death
sentences after a jury deadlock fifteen times since the provision was created
in 1984.9
These cases of judicially imposed death sentences are, however, unique
in the United States. Only Missouri and Indiana allow a judge to impose a
death sentence after the jury deadlocks on the ultimate determination of
whether to sentence a defendant to death.10 These two states authorize judgeimposed death sentences because of U.S. Supreme Court precedent that
allows judges to only make sentencing determinations.11 These cases emanate
from the Sixth Amendment protection of a jury trial for criminal defendants.12
Still, Eighth Amendment restrictions on implementation of the death penalty
muddy the distinction between sentencing and findings of fact required to be
made by a jury under the Sixth Amendment. Since the consequences of the
death penalty are the highest possible, people should be confident that the
6. Patrick, supra note 1. Judge Kelly Parker faces re-election every 6 years.
Kelly W. Parker, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Kelly_W._Parker
[perma.cc/3TEQ-24S2] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). During 2017, he was in the
middle of his six-year term, and he did not face re-election until 2020. Id. It should
also be noted that he ran unopposed in his 2014 election. Id.
7. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). However, the
Missouri Supreme Court later overturned his death sentence. Id. at 272.
8. Joseph C. Welling, Missouri’s Death Penalty Jury Deadlock Provision Is
Unconstitutional,
ST.
LOUIS
POST
DISPATCH
(Jan.
16,
2019),
https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/missouri-s-death-penalty-jurydeadlock-provision-is-unconstitutional/article_a2b5f34a-4cf3-59a3-880df52acfe9ee97.html [perma.cc/BD9B-3RYT]. Greene County Judge Thomas
Mountjoy sentenced Craig Wood to death in 2018 for the rape and murder of ten-yearold Hailey Owens after a jury deadlocked on the decision of life without parole or
death. Harrison Keegan, Will Craig Wood’s Death Penalty Hold Up?, SPRINGFIELD
NEWS-LEADER
(Jan.
11,
2018),
https://www.newsleader.com/story/news/crime/2018/01/11/craig-wood-executed-some-experts-havedoubts/1021025001/[perma.cc/T7HB-NU5T]. Multiple other individuals were also
sentenced to death by a judge before 2013. See McLaughlin v. State, 378 S.W.3d 328,
336 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); State v. Shockley, 410 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Mo. 2013) (en
banc).
9. Welling, supra note 8.
10. Missouri Supreme Court Grants New Sentencing Trial to Man Who Was
Sentenced to Death Despite 11 Jurors’ Votes for Life, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://archive.deathpenaltyinfo.org/category/categories/states/missouri
[perma.cc/STA4-2D4W] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).
11. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616
(2016).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Missouri death penalty scheme provides defendants their constitutional
protections. Yet, many people question whether this is true.13
This Note evaluates whether the Missouri death penalty scheme meets
Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause requirements. Part II explains the
Missouri death penalty scheme, the Missouri Supreme Court’s conflicting
interpretations of the scheme, and the confusion that has been created by this
precedent. Next, Part III dissects the Missouri Supreme Court’s recent
decision in State v. Wood, which found the Missouri death penalty does not
violate the Sixth Amendment. Part IV addresses whether the weighing of
aggravators and mitigators can ever be a sentencing factor. Then, Part IV
considers whether Missouri’s death penalty statute makes the weighing of
aggravators and mitigators a factual finding, despite no constitutional
requirement to do so. Finally, Part IV argues that Missouri can and should fix
its death penalty statute to leave no doubt that all constitutional protections
are afforded to defendants in death penalty cases.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees “in all
criminal prosecutions . . . a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury . . . .”14
Further, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires that a jury
find each element of a crime “beyond a reasonable doubt.”15 These two
safeguards for criminal defendants appear straightforward, but they become
complicated when applied to “bifurcated trials,” which are used to impose the
death penalty. This Part examines U.S. Supreme Court precedent on the due
process rights of defendants in death penalty cases and the Missouri Supreme
Court’s interpretation of that precedent. Section A will trace the U.S.
Supreme Court’s precedent by first analyzing its interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment. Then, the unique statutory scheme required by the Supreme
Court for death penalty statutes will be explained, including the meaning of
“bifurcated trial.” Finally, Section A will examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s
application of its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to its death penalty
jurisprudence. Section B will then focus on the Missouri death penalty and
the Missouri Supreme Court’s application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

A. “Endors[ing] the Incoherence”16: The U.S. Supreme Court’s
Confusing Capital Jurisprudence
In his concurrence in Marsh v. Kansas, Justice Antonin G. Scalia
described the U.S. Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence as “incoherent” and
13. See Welling, supra note 8 (“Missouri can and must do better.”); Keegan
supra note 8 (“The whole idea of the Sixth Amendment is that a jury of your peers
makes that judgment call.”) (internal citations omitted).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359–60 (1970).
16. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 182 (2006) (Scalia, J. concurring).
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stated that he did “not endorse that incoherence” before making a decision in
accordance with that confusing jurisprudence.17 The Supreme Court’s
incoherent capital jurisprudence evolved from a unique intersection between
Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment18 and
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.19 The increased protections for
capital defendants under the Eighth Amendment have, in turn, created new
due process protections for capital defendants. This Part will explain how the
Eighth Amendment has impacted due process protections and analyze the
current state of U.S. Supreme Court due process protections in capital cases.
This Part will first detail the Supreme Court’s due process protections for
criminal defendants in non-capital cases. Then, it will lay out the special
protections guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment in capital cases. Finally,
this Part will explain how the two interact by analyzing the most recent cases.

1. “By a Jury Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”20
Along with incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to
the states,21 the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires every
fact necessary to constitute the crime be found beyond a reasonable doubt.22
While this requirement seems clear, there persisted – and persists – doubt as
to what qualifies as a fact necessary to constitute the crime charged, also
referred to as an element. The Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey attempted to
explain what constituted an element of the crime charged.23
In Apprendi, the defendant “fired several shots into the home of an
African-American family and made a statement – which he later retracted –
that he did not want the family in his neighborhood because of their race.”24
The defendant then pleaded guilty to second-degree possession of a firearm
for an unlawful purpose under New Jersey law, carrying a sentence of five to
ten years.25 Following the guilty plea, the prosecutor then sought to enhance
the sentence based on the state’s hate crime statute, which provided for an
enhanced sentence if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant committed the crime with a purpose to intimidate the group
because of race.26 The judge found the crime was racially motivated and
enhanced the defendant’s sentence to twelve years.27

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 107 (2013).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 146 (1968).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000).
Id.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 466.
Id.
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On appeal, Apprendi claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause required the finding that the crime was racially motivated to
be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.28 New Jersey argued that the
state’s enhancement for racially motivated crimes was a sentencing factor and
not an element of the crime charged.29 While an element is necessary to prove
guilt or innocence, a sentencing factor “help[s] to determine the sentence
imposed upon one who has been found guilty.”30 The Court rejected the
State’s argument, holding, “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.”31
The Court decided that the New Jersey statute, which enhanced
sentences for racially motivated crimes, was an element of the crime and not
a sentencing factor because it increased the maximum sentence.32 Further, the
Court noted that the inquiry of the elemental nature is “one not of form, but
of effect – does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”33 Therefore,
the Court held that the New Jersey sentencing enhancement for racially
motivated crimes must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt because
it was an element and not a sentencing factor.34 This framework for deciding
when due process rights of a jury trial requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt attach seems straightforward until considering the special protections
provided in capital punishment cases.

2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Bifurcated Trial
While the U.S. Supreme Court developed its jurisprudence on due
process protections for criminal defendants, it also revolutionized its death
penalty jurisprudence. First, the Supreme Court held Georgia’s death penalty
scheme – and by proxy all other death penalty schemes – violated the Eighth
Amendment.35 Justice Stewart ultimately concluded “that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so
freakishly imposed.”36 However, the Supreme Court upheld the Georgia
statute four years later when Georgia used a bifurcated trial for death
sentences.37
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 471.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 559 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 497.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 310 (Stewart, J. concurring).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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Under the bifurcated procedure, the trial had two phases: a guilt phase
and a sentencing phase.38 If the jury found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt in the guilt phase, then the trial would move to the
sentencing phase where the jury was required to consider mitigating and
aggravating evidence.39 Aggravating evidence is evidence that increases the
guilt of the crime, and mitigating evidence is evidence that reduces the moral
culpability of the person committing the crime.40 Further, the jury was
required to find the existence of at least one aggravating factor – out of ten
possible aggravating factors – beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury could
sentence the defendant to death.41 The judge was then bound by the jury’s
recommended sentence – either death or life without parole.42 The statute also
provided for “special expedited direct review by the Supreme Court of
Georgia of the appropriateness of imposing the sentence of death in the
particular case.”43 While Georgia laid out a template for death penalty statutes
that did not violate the Eighth Amendment, there still remained uncertainty as
to what due process rights were required in the sentencing phase.

3. The Supreme Court Puts a Ring On It
In Walton v. Arizona, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment did not
require a jury determination of facts during the sentencing phase because the
facts in the sentencing phase – such as the existence of aggravating or
mitigating factors – were sentencing considerations and not elements of the
crime.44 After the Court held in Apprendi that “any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt,”45 the Court
revisited Arizona’s death penalty scheme in Ring v. Arizona.46
The Arizona death penalty scheme – like the one in Gregg – was a
bifurcated proceeding with the first stage consisting of a guilt determination
and the second stage being a sentencing phase.47 However, unlike Gregg, the
sentencing phase was conducted before the court alone, and the judge alone
made the factual determinations required to impose a sentence of death,
including the determination of the existence of at least one aggravating
circumstance.48 The Court held that “[c]apital defendants, no less than
38. Id. at 163–64.
39. Id. at 165.
40. Aggravating Circumstance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019);
Mitigator, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
41. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165–66.
42. Id. at 166.
43. Id.
44. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990).
45. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
46. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
47. Id. at 592.
48. Id. at 592–93.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/11

6

Essma: DEAD-Locked

2020]

JUDGE-IMPOSED DEATH SENTENCES

277

noncapital defendants . . . [were] entitled to a jury determination of any fact
on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum
punishment.”49
In so holding, the Court invalidated Arizona’s death penalty scheme.50
The Court reasoned that the maximum punishment Ring could have received
due to the jury’s finding of guilt was life imprisonment.51 Therefore, the
finding of an aggravating factor in the sentencing phase was a fact on which
the legislature conditioned an increase in the maximum punishment.52 Under
this scheme, the finding of aggravators acted as elements, and aggravators
must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.53 The Court further
emphasized that Apprendi considered the question of whether a finding is a
sentencing consideration or an element was “one not of form, but of effect.”54
Therefore, while Arizona tried to construe the finding of an aggravator as a
sentencing factor, it was an element because finding an aggravator was
necessary to increase the maximum punishment from life without parole to
death.55

4. Revisiting Ring
In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited Ring in Hurst v. Florida.56 In
Hurst, the Court heard a challenge to Florida’s death penalty scheme that
required the jury to issue an “advisory verdict,” that was ultimately not
binding on the trial judge.57 The Court decided the advisory verdict by the
jury was not a necessary factual finding, and therefore, “[a] jury’s mere
recommendation [wa]s not enough.”58 Writing in broader terms than Ring,
the Court emphasized that the importance lay on the fact that without the
judge’s findings, Hurst could not have been sentenced to death.59
In so holding, the Court overruled two prior decisions – both before Ring
– that affirmed Florida’s death penalty scheme: Spaziano v. Florida60 and
Hildwin v. Florida.61 In Spaziano, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to
death despite a jury recommended sentence of life without parole.62 The
Court held that the Sixth Amendment did not guarantee a right to a jury
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 589.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 597.
Id.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 602 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).
Id. at 604–05 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
Id. at 622.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 622.
468 U.S. 557 (1984).
490 U.S. 638 (1989).
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 458.
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determination on whether to impose death or life without parole.63 In Hurst,
the Court specifically held that Spaziano was “overruled to the extent [it]
allow[ed] a sentencing judge to find an aggravating circumstance,
independent of a jury’s factfinding, that is necessary for the imposition of the
death penalty.”64 Some believed the Court only required a jury find the
existence of an aggravating factor for the Florida death penalty scheme to
comply with Ring,65 but others read Hurst more broadly to also apply to the
weighing of aggravators and mitigators.66

B. The Missouri Death Penalty Scheme
Much like other state death penalty schemes, the Missouri death penalty
scheme has evolved in light of U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. This Section will first detail Missouri’s current death penalty
statute. Then, it will review Missouri Supreme Court interpretations of the
death penalty statute and the court’s application of Ring to it. Further, this
Section will point out some of the inconsistencies of the Missouri Supreme
Court’s decisions.

1. Missouri’s Death Penalty Statute
The Missouri death penalty scheme is unique because it phrases the
sentencing phase in terms of what is necessary to impose a life sentence.67
The Missouri statute states:
The trier shall assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment
without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the
governor:
(1) If the trier finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant is intellectually disabled; or
(2) If the trier does not find beyond a reasonable doubt at least one
of the statutory aggravating circumstances set out in subsection 2
of section 565.032; or
(3) If the trier concludes that there is evidence in mitigation of
punishment, including but not limited to evidence supporting the
statutory mitigating circumstances listed in subsection 3 of section

63. Id. at 464.
64. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624.
65. Maria T. Kolar, “Finding” a Way to Complete the Ring of Capital Jury
Sentencing, 95 DENV. L. REV. 671, 714 (2018).
66. Janet C. Hoeffel, Death Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 70 ARK. L. REV. 267,
294 (2017).
67. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2018).
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565.032, which is sufficient to outweigh the evidence in
aggravation of punishment found by the trier; or
(4) If the trier decides under all of the circumstances not to assess
and declare the punishment of death. If the trier is a jury it shall
be so instructed.68

Therefore, if a jury decides affirmatively to any of these four questions,
the death penalty will not be imposed on the defendant.69 For example, if a
jury answered affirmatively that they did not find beyond a reasonable doubt
the existence of at least one aggravating factor, the defendant would receive a
life sentence.
There is another provision of the Missouri death penalty statute known
as the “deadlock” jury provision.70 The deadlock jury provision provides that
if the jury cannot decide on any of the questions – an inability of the jury to
unanimously vote yes or no – then the court will decide to impose life without
parole or death.71 In doing so, the judge follows the same procedure –
explained above – as the jury.72 Clearly – following Ring – the judge could
not impose a death sentence if the jury deadlocked on the existence of an
aggravating factor; however, it is not as clear that the weighing test or decision
to impose death must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Naturally, these questions have been raised before the Missouri Supreme
Court.

2. The Missouri Supreme Court’s Conflicting Post-Ring Decisions
and Its Impact
The questions raised on the constitutionality of Missouri’s death penalty
statute were not originally met with much clarity. This Part begins by
analyzing the Missouri Supreme Court’s first attempt to answer concerns
about the constitutionality of Missouri’s death penalty scheme after Ring.
Then, it examines the Missouri Supreme Court’s curious backpedal on its
original determination. Finally, this Part discusses the difficulty the Missouri
Supreme Court’s post-Ring cases provided for the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri in reaching conflicting results on similar
challenges to the Missouri death penalty statute.
a. State v. Whitfield
Less than a year after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring, the
Missouri Supreme Court, in State v. Whitfield, heard a challenge to the
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Welling, supra note 8.
§ 565.030.4.
Id.
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constitutionality of Missouri’s death penalty statute based on Ring.73 While
the Missouri death penalty had the same scheme as the current statute, there
were a few differences in reference to the first two steps.74 The first step in
the statute at issue in Whitfield was the same as what Missouri now labels step
two – the finding of at least one aggravating factor.75 The second step required
an imposition of life without parole “[i]f the trier does not find that the
evidence in aggravation of punishment, including but not limited to evidence
supporting the statutory aggravating circumstances listed in subsection 2 of
section 565.032, warrants imposing the death sentence.”76
In Whitfield, the jury was split eleven-to-one in favor of life
imprisonment.77 Since the jury could not reach a unanimous decision, the
determination was left to the judge, who ultimately imposed the death
penalty.78 Whitfield challenged this procedure as a violation of Ring, which
requires a “jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions
an increase in their maximum punishment.”79 The court agreed with
Whitfield and decided that the judge had made improper factual
determinations in this case.80 The court held that the first three steps
constituted factual findings that fell within the province of the jury.81 In so
holding, the court rejected the State’s arguments that steps two and three
constituted the jury’s “subjective and discretionary opinion.”82 Instead, the
court explained that the first three steps were “prerequisites to the trier of
fact’s determination that a defendant is death-eligible.”83 Therefore, the first
three steps were facts necessary to enhance the maximum sentence.84 Finally,
the court noted that only in the fourth step was the jury given discretion to
make the ultimate determination of life without parole or death.85
Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, however, disagreed with the majority’s
application of Ring to the Missouri death penalty scheme and dissented.86
Judge Limbaugh agreed with the majority that steps one and two required
factual findings, but he believed that step three did not require factual
findings.87 Judge Limbaugh first noted that step three called for “a wholly
73. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), abrogated by State
v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
74. Id. at 258 (quoting MO REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2000)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 261.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Ring v. Arizona 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002)).
80. Id. at 261–62.
81. Id. at 261.
82. Id. at 259.
83. Id. at 261.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 275 (Limbaugh, J. dissenting).
87. Id. at 277 (Limbaugh, J. dissenting).
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subjective and discretionary analysis,”88 and then added that while steps one
and two called for findings, step three required the jurors to come to a
conclusion.89 He thought this distinction in wording made step three an
exercise in judgment and not a factual finding.90 Additionally, Judge
Limbaugh noticed that a finding in favor of the defendant on step three acted
“only to decrease the punishment, subjecting an otherwise death-eligible
defendant to life imprisonment.”91 Finally, Judge Limbaugh would have
upheld the death sentence because the jury form provided that failure to make
a unanimous decision in steps one and two resulted in life imprisonment.92
Therefore, the jury made the necessary factual determinations in steps one and
two, and the judge was allowed to make the discretionary sentencing decisions
of steps three and four.93
b. The Backpedal
While the Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling in Whitfield made a clear
determination that the first three steps constituted fact finding, the court later
chipped away at its own holding in State v. Glass94 and State v. Zink.95 In
Glass, the court held that “[n]othing in Whitfield or in section 560.030.4
requires the jury to make the findings in the last two steps beyond a reasonable
doubt.”96 The court noted that Whitfield just required a jury determination for
steps two and three, not a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.97 In Zink, the
court went even further, stating that neither of the last two steps “require[d] a
finding of a fact that may increase Mr. Zink’s penalty.”98 The court decided
that the last two steps do not need to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.99
The Missouri Supreme Court’s backpedal in Glass and Zink has led to
curious results. In fact, two judges on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri dealt with challenges to the constitutionality of Missouri’s
statute on habeas review, and they reached seemingly conflicting results.100

88. Id. (Limbaugh, J. dissenting) (citing State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417, 430
(Mo. 1983)).
89. Id. at 278 (Limbaugh, J. dissenting).
90. Id. (Limbaugh, J. dissenting).
91. Id. at 279 (Limbaugh, J. dissenting).
92. Id. at 279 (Limbaugh, J. dissenting).
93. Id. (Limbaugh, J. dissenting).
94. State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
95. State v. Zink, 278 S.W.3d 170 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
96. Glass, 136 S.W.3d at 521.
97. Id.
98. Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 193.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Steele, 173 F. Supp. 3d 855, 891 (E.D. Mo. 2016);
Johnson v. Steele, No. 4:13-CV-2046, 2018 WL3008307, at *22 (E.D. Mo. June 15,
2018).
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c. Pick Your Precedent: The Federal Eastern District of Missouri Split
The limited scope of review on habeas corpus proved particularly
challenging for federal district courts when they recently reviewed the
Missouri death penalty scheme in McLaughlin v. Steele101 and Johnson v.
Steele.102 Both opinions reflect the difficulty in determining the nature of the
weighing test in Missouri’s death penalty scheme, given inconsistent Missouri
Supreme Court precedent.
In McLaughlin, Judge Catherine D. Perry overturned McLaughlin’s
death sentence – which was imposed by a judge after the jury deadlocked –
on habeas review.103 Judge Perry first noted that the Missouri Supreme Court
decided in Whitfield that the weighing of aggravators and mitigators was a
factual finding and that, as a federal court reviewing a state court’s decision,
she was bound by the state court’s interpretation of state law.104 Further, since
the weighing was a factual finding, the jury had to unanimously find that the
mitigators did not outweigh the aggravators.105
Judge Perry concluded that it could not be determined whether the jury
deadlocked on the weighing step because the question on the jury form asked
only if the jury unanimously did not find that the mitigators outweighed the
aggravators.106 In other words, there was no way of knowing what the jury
found, only what the jury did not find.107 This means that it was not certain if
some jurors found the mitigators outweighed the aggravators while others did
not.108 All that was clear was that not all of the jurors found the mitigators
outweighed the aggravators.109 Judge Perry concluded that in order for the
judge to impose the death penalty under Ring, the jury had to unanimously
find that the mitigators did not outweigh the aggravators.110 Since this could
not be determined, Ring prohibited the judge from imposing the death
sentence in McLaughlin.111
While Judge Perry required a unanimous jury finding on the weighing
step, Judge Limbaugh rejected the argument that the weighing step needed to
be found beyond a reasonable doubt in Johnson v. Steele.112 In Johnson, the
jury sentenced the defendant to death.113 Therefore, it was clear the jury had

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

173 F. Supp. 3d 855 (E.D. Mo. 2016).
No. 4:13-CV-2046, 2018 WL3008307 (E.D. Mo. June 15, 2018).
McLaughlin, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 891.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 896.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, 2018 WL3008307 at *23.
Id. at *21.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/11

12

Essma: DEAD-Locked

2020]

JUDGE-IMPOSED DEATH SENTENCES

283

unanimously found the mitigators did not outweigh the aggravators;114
however, Johnson argued that the jury needed to make that finding beyond a
reasonable doubt.115 Judge Limbaugh rejected this argument because the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh allowed states to set up the weighing of
aggravators and mitigators test however they wanted, including shifting the
burden to the defendant to prove that mitigators outweighed aggravators.116
Further, Judge Limbaugh rejected Johnson’s argument that the weighing
test was an element of the offense of capital murder that Ring required be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.117 Judge Limbaugh reasoned that
the Missouri Supreme Court did not interpret the weighing test as an element
of the crime because it did not require it be found beyond a reasonable doubt
in Glass.118 The lone dissenter in Whitfield, Judge Limbaugh, acknowledged
that the Missouri Supreme Court’s holding – that the weighing test was an
element – conflicted with the holdings in Glass and Zink.119 Ultimately, Judge
Limbaugh decided it was “clear that Whitfield d[id] not stand for the
proposition that the weighing ‘fact’ at step three [wa]s a fact necessary to
increase the range of punishment” because the Missouri Supreme Court did
not require the weighing test to be found beyond a reasonable doubt in Zink
and Glass.120 Therefore, because states have discretion to shift the burden of
proof of the weighing test to defendants and Missouri interpreted its statute to
say the weighing test was not an element, Judge Limbaugh found that the
Missouri Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law.121

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In 2019, the Missouri Supreme Court revisited Whitfield and the
subsequent conflicting opinions.122 In State v. Wood, the court finally took
the opportunity to formally overrule Whitfield’s determination that the
weighing step was a factual finding.123 Three judges, however, dissented from
the majority’s decision that the weighing step was not a factual finding.124
This Part will discuss the majority’s decision and then explain the dissent.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at *23.
Id. at *21.
Id. (citing Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 170–71 (2006)).
Id. at *22.
Id. (citing State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 521 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)).
Id. at *23.
Id. at *22.
Id. at *23.
State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 581–90 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
Id. at 586.
Id. at 596–599 (Stith, J. dissenting).
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A. State v. Wood
In 2017, a jury found Craig Wood guilty of murdering ten-year-old
Hailey Owens.125 The jury then unanimously determined beyond a reasonable
doubt that six aggravating factors existed but deadlocked on the weighing
step.126 Judge Thomas Mountjoy found the aggravating factors outweighed
the mitigating factors and sentenced Wood to death.127 Wood appealed and
argued that his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated because the
weighing step was a factual finding reserved for the jury, not the judge.128
Writing for the majority, Judge Zel M. Fischer found that the weighing
step in the Missouri death penalty statute was not a factual finding required to
be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.129 First, Judge Fischer
explained that Ring established the existence of aggravating factors to be a
factual finding that must be made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.130
Further, Hurst was merely a straightforward application of Ring, “stand[ing]
only for the proposition that, in a jury tried case, aggravating circumstances
are facts that must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”131
Therefore, Hurst did not expand the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Ring to
also include the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors.132
Additionally, Judge Fischer reasoned that the weighing of aggravating
and mitigating factors is a discretionary decision that is a “question of
mercy.”133 While the jury could provide a “factually verifiable answer”
regarding the existence of aggravating factors, “[n]either a jury nor a judge
can prove or disprove a conclusion the evidence on one side outweighs the
evidence on the other.”134 Therefore, the decision that the brutality of Wood’s
crime outweighed his personal circumstances was discretionary and not
required to be found by a jury.135
Finally, the majority acknowledged that Whitfield “suggested” the
weighing step was a factual finding, but they overruled Whitfield “[t]o the
extent that [it] presume[d] the weighing step [was] a factual finding
constitutionally reserved for the jury.”136 In doing so, he noted that the
125. Id. at 571–73.
126. Id. at 582–83.
127. Harrison Keegan & Giacomo Bologna, Craig Wood Sentenced to Death
Penalty for Killing Hailey Owens, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/crime/2018/01/11/craig-wood-sentenceddeath-penalty-killing-hailey-owens/1020415001/ [perma.cc/MM5J-7TJB].
128. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 582.
129. Id. at 585.
130. Id. at 583.
131. Id. at 584.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 584 (citing Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 642 (2016)).
134. Id. at 585.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 586–87.
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Missouri Supreme Court’s most recent decisions found the weighing step was
not a factual finding.137 Indeed, the court’s decisions in Zink, Anderson,
Dorsey, and Nunley all contradict Whitfield, although not explicitly. In
conclusion, Judge Fischer held that neither Missouri’s statute nor the U.S.
Constitution made the weighing step a factual finding required to be found by
the jury.138

B. The Dissent
In her dissent, Judge Laura Denvir Stith agreed with the majority that the
fourth step was not a factual finding, and she did not disagree with the
majority’s decision that the U.S. Constitution did not always require the
weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors to be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.139 Instead, Judge Stith believed the Missouri statute made
the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors at the third step a factual
finding.140 Judge Stith recognized the majority opinion’s interpretation of the
third step would leave the fourth step superfluous.141 Indeed, the majority’s
declaration that the third step is a “question of mercy” would make the fourth
step, which actually allows the jury to grant mercy considering all of the
circumstances, redundant.142 While both steps allow the jury to balance
evidence, the third step narrows the evidence the jury may consider, making
it a factual finding as opposed to a solely discretionary decision.143
Furthermore, unlike the majority, Judge Stith believed that asking a jury to
balance evidence could be a factual finding because courts frequently ask the
jury to balance evidence.144 For example, one of the court’s standards of
review asks whether the jury verdict is “against the weight of evidence.”145
This standard of review acknowledges that juries are constantly asked to
weigh evidence, and they may factually err in the weight they assign the
evidence.146 Therefore, the statute can and does require the jury to make a
factual determination on the weighing of aggravating and mitigating
evidence.147

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 585–87.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 598 (Stith, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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IV. DISCUSSION
As has often been repeated, “[D]eath is different . . . .”148 Thus far, this
Note has outlined how Eighth Amendment concerns with the implementation
of the death penalty essentially created Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights for death penalty defendants. This led to the “incoherence” of
determining what constitutional requirements are necessary to carry out the
death penalty. Missouri represents a perfect example of the difficulty states
face in interpreting the U.S. Supreme Court’s tricky jurisprudence. This Part
begins by reviewing the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision that the Sixth
Amendment does not require the third step of the Missouri death penalty
statute to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. To do that, it will
first evaluate whether the Sixth Amendment mandates the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating factors always be a factual finding. Then, this Part
will address Judge Stith’s contention that the form of the statute – not the Sixth
Amendment – makes the weighing step in Missouri’s statute a factual finding.
Finally, this Part takes a policy-oriented view and suggests that Missouri
should end judicial death sentences altogether.

A. Can the Weighing Test Be A Sentencing Factor?
As previously mentioned, Ring and Hurst expressly prohibit the judge in
a jury trial from imposing death based on his or her findings on the existence
of aggravating factors.149 Neither case, however, directly addresses whether
the balancing of aggravators and mitigators is always a factual finding or if it
can be a sentencing factor. While the Missouri Supreme Court found that the
Sixth Amendment allowed the weighing of aggravators and mitigators to be a
sentencing factor, different courts and scholars believe that U.S. Supreme
Court precedent suggests weighing tests must be factual findings.150 Courts
and scholars arrived at that interpretation through different means. Some
believe that Hurst extended the Supreme Court’s holding in Ring to cover
more than just the existence of aggravators. Others use older cases to argue
that the U.S. Supreme Court has de facto made the weighing of aggravators
and mitigators necessary to impose the death penalty, effectively making
weighing tests factual findings. This Section will address both arguments by
first determining whether Hurst expanded, or just narrowly affirmed, Ring.
Then, this Section will evaluate other interpretations, specifically looking at a
2016 decision from the Supreme Court of Delaware.

148. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
149. See supra Parts II.A.3–4.
150. Ex parte Bohannon, 222 So.3d 525, 529–30 (Al. 2016) (holding that
weighing aggravators and mitigators is not a fact finding required to be made by a jury
because once an aggravating factor was found the defendant was death-eligible,
requiring no other findings to be sentenced to death).
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1. Hurst: The Same Old Thing
While the Missouri Supreme Court in Wood believed Hurst was merely
a straightforward application of Ring,151 some courts and commentators have
opined that Hurst’s broad language suggests an expansion of Ring.152 Indeed,
the Court’s phrasing of the central holdings in Ring and Hurst differed subtly.
First, Ring held that a jury, not a judge, must be the one “to find an aggravating
circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”153 This holding
made it clear that the Sixth Amendment applied to finding aggravators.
However, the Court in Hurst held, “The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not
a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a death sentence.”154 Professor
Hessick from the North Carolina School of Law and Professor Berry from the
Mississippi School of Law believe Hurst’s broader phrasing actually
expanded Ring’s holding.155 Essentially, they argue that the holding in Ring
limited the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement to findings in the narrowing
stage.156
As explained by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Supreme Court precedent on
death penalty decision-making can be broken down into two requirements: the
narrowing requirement and the selection decision.157 The narrowing
requirement refers to the requirement that the death penalty scheme must
“genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
compared to others found guilty of murder.”158 The narrowing requirement
may be met by the finding of aggravators. A defendant is not constitutionally
eligible to receive the death penalty until aggravators are found. Therefore,
Ring stood for the proposition that the jury had to find the facts necessary to
make the defendant death-eligible but said nothing about the selection
decision.
The selection decision “determines whether a death-eligible defendant
should actually receive the death penalty.”159 This decision requires
mitigating evidence to be considered to allow for an individualized

151. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 584.
152. See e.g., Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 436 (Del. 2016) (Strine, J., concurring)
(finding Hurst’s mandate that a jury must make all of the factual findings necessary
to impose death includes a jury’s role in selecting the death penalty as well as the
determination of death eligibility); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & William W.
Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst, 66 UCLA L. REV. 448, 464–76
(2019).
153. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
154. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).
155. Hessick & Berry III, supra note 152, at 464–75.
156. Id.
157. Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1054 (2018).
158. Id. (internal citations omitted).
159. Id.
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determination.160 Thus, to Professors Hessick and Berry, Hurst’s broad
language encompasses the selection decision because death penalty statutes
necessarily require consideration of mitigators – like Missouri’s weighing step
– before imposition of the death penalty.161 This makes the weighing step a
fact necessary to increase punishment. Under this reading of Hurst, every step
of the Missouri death penalty statute would have to be found by a jury because
they are all required to impose the death penalty. Indeed, Professors Hessick
and Berry confirm this with a cursory analysis of the Missouri statute.162
However, this reading of Hurst overlooks key aspects of the decision.
First, the Florida statute struck down in Hurst made all the jury’s findings
mere recommendations.163 This included the jury’s findings on aggravators,
giving the judge sole discretion on finding of aggravators.164 Therefore, a
straightforward interpretation of Ring would have struck down the Florida
death penalty statute. In other words, the Court did not need to expand Ring
to reach the same outcome. Furthermore, as explained by the Missouri
Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hurst overruled prior decisions
upholding the Florida death penalty statute “to the extent they allow a
sentencing judge to find an aggravating circumstance, independent of a jury’s
factfinding, that is necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”165 In sum,
the central holding of Hurst was written broadly, but the Court clearly limited
the extent to which it overruled past cases and never suggested that the
selection decision required a jury determination. Still, Chief Justice Leo E.
Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court articulated the same reading in his
concurrence in Rauf v. State, but he expanded on the implications of the
interaction between the Sixth and Eighth Amendments.166

2. “[V]oila, a Sixth Amendment [R]ight [I]s [C]reated”167
Chief Justice Strine’s concurring opinion emphasized the necessity of
both the narrowing requirement and the selection decision in imposing the
death sentence.168 Essentially, Chief Justice Strine explained that the U.S.
Supreme Court placed requirements on death penalty schemes in order to
comply with the Eighth Amendment.169 For example, the Court’s precedent
requires death penalty schemes to narrow the class of death-eligible
defendants, often done with the jury finding aggravators and mitigators.170
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 1054–55.
Hessick & Berry III, supra note 152, at 502.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 460–61.
Id. at 461.
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016).
Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 436 (Del. 2016) (Strine, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 476 (Strine, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 475–76.
Id. at 478–79.
Id. at 475–76.
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This Eighth Amendment right created a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury
find the aggravators because a defendant was not death-eligible without the
finding of the existence of aggravators.171 As Chief Justice Strine put it, “By
considering this a ‘fact finding’ essential to the imposition of a death sentence,
voila, a Sixth Amendment right is created.”172
Chief Justice Strine opined that this same reasoning extended to the
selection decision.173 He explained that the Court, in a series of cases,
required mitigators to be considered in order for death penalty schemes to
comply with the Eighth Amendment.174 Therefore, “fact-findings beyond
death-eligibility are not optional.”175 Since considering mitigators – which
the Missouri death penalty accomplishes in its weighing step – is not optional,
it is a fact necessary to impose the death penalty and the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury determination should apply.176
In reaching his decision, Chief Justice Strine overlooked the U.S.
Supreme Court’s distinction between the narrowing requirement and the
selection decision. To begin, the Court has often classified the selection
decision as “individualized sentencing.”177 Furthermore, the Court has
granted states significant discretion in how they allow the sentencer to
consider mitigating evidence.178 From Apprendi to Hurst, the Court’s Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence has been concerned with distinguishing elements
of a crime from sentencing factors.179 The Court has plainly accepted that the
narrowing requirement involves an element of the crime of capital murder,
but the selection decision does not have to be an element of the crime and
could just be sentencing.
Once a defendant is found death-eligible, presumably by a jury
determination that one or more aggravators exist, the Constitution does not
require any more factual findings to impose the death sentence. Because the
defendant is death-eligible, additional findings do not increase the range of
punishment. The consideration of mitigators reflects a constitutional
requirement for conducting the sentencing once it has been determined that
the defendant can receive the death penalty. Based on this, a death penalty
scheme could end the jury’s role once the jury found the existence of

171. Id. at 476.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 477.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994); see also, Kansas v. Marsh,
548 U.S. 163, 174 (2006) (“The use of mitigation evidence is a product of the
requirement of individualized sentencing.”).
178. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 n.13 (1983) (“[S]pecific standards for
balancing aggravating against mitigating circumstances are not constitutionally
required.”); see also Marsh, 548 U.S. 164–65 (finding that Kansas could impose the
death penalty when the jury found the mitigators and aggravators were in “equipoise”).
179. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 492 (2000).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 11

290

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

aggravators. However, some may want a death penalty scheme that provides
more protection than the Sixth Amendment by making the consideration of
mitigators a factual finding.

B. Does the Missouri Statute Make the Weighing Step a Factual
Finding?
While U.S. Supreme Court precedent allows states to structure their
death penalty statute so that the balancing of aggravators and mitigators is a
sentencing factor, many contend that states can design their death penalty
statute so the weighing of aggravators and mitigators is a factual finding.
States may, in fact, want to do this to provide defendants more protection of
their right to a trial by jury than the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, Judge Stith
argued in her dissent in Wood that the Missouri statute did just that. Still, the
majority in Wood seemed to suggest the weighing of aggravators and
mitigators could likely never be a factual finding because it is essentially a
discretionary decision without a factually verifiable answer. This Section
analyzes both arguments by first deciding that states can structure weighing
tests to be factual findings and then by evaluating whether Missouri structured
its death penalty statute to provide criminal defendants these extra protections.

1. Factual Discretion
Judge Fischer’s majority opinion – and to an extent, Judge Limbaugh’s
dissent in Whitfield180 – suggested that the weighing of aggravators and
mitigators may never be a factual finding.181 Citing to several U.S. Supreme
Court cases, Judge Fischer explained that “the selection decision is a
discretionary judgment.”182 Furthermore, Judge Fischer believed that the
weighing of aggravators and mitigators could not be a factual finding because
there was no “factually verifiable answer” to whether the mitigators
outweighed the aggravators.183
However, Judge Stith correctly explained that juries are often tasked
with balancing and weighing evidence, such as determining the credibility of
witnesses and resolving conflicts in testimony.184 Indeed, trademark law
provides an excellent example of the trust placed in juries to weigh evidence
to make a factual finding on an issue that may not have a “factually verifiable
answer.” To sue for trademark infringement, plaintiffs need to show a

180. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 277 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (Limbaugh, J.
dissenting).
181. State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 584 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 585.
184. Id. at 598 (Stith, J. dissenting).
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likelihood of confusion.185 The likelihood of confusion inquiry requires an
evaluation of several factors, ranging from six to eight depending on the
federal circuit.186 Those factors are then weighed against each other without
any single factor being determinative.187 Most federal circuits consider both
the finding of the factors and the weighing of the factors as questions of fact
to be decided by the fact-finder, which can be a jury.188 There is no factually
verifiable answer as to whether factors in any given case weigh in favor of
likelihood of confusion, yet jurors may be trusted with making that
determination. A further example of difficult questions with no factually
verifiable answers entrusted to juries is calculating damages for pain and
suffering or wrongful death.189
In sum, the U.S. legal system often trusts juries with tough
determinations. This may be a necessary result of the importance the U.S.
Constitution places on the jury trial. While there may not be a factually
verifiable answer as to whether mitigators outweigh aggravators, several
examples prove that there does not need to be a factually verifiable answer to
make something a factual finding or element. Therefore, a legislature could
write a statute to make the weighing of mitigators and aggravators a factual
finding.

2. Lost in Interpretation
While it seems that states can make the weighing of aggravators and
mitigators factual findings, the Missouri Supreme Court decided that the
weighing step in Missouri’s statute is not a factual finding.190 However, in so
holding, the court failed to adequately address Missouri’s statute in particular.
Instead, the court relied on its post-Whitfield decisions that backpedaled from
its interpretation of the weighing step as a factual finding.191 Those decisions
clearly regarded the weighing step as a sentencing factor, but they too failed
to analyze the Missouri statute in any great detail.192 Indeed, their failure to

185. JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY KEVLIN, TRADEMARK AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 366–70. (LexisNexis 5th ed.
2013).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 389–90. The Second and Sixth Circuits consider the findings as to the
factors to be questions of fact but consider the ultimate balancing of the factors to be
a question of law. Id. The Federal Circuit considers both to be questions of law. Id.
189. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Candler, 283 F. 881, 884 (8th Cir.
1922).
190. State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 585 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
191. Id.
192. The majority relied on: Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 192–93 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc); State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529, 540 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); State v.
Dorsey, 318 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); and State v. Nunley 341 S.W.3d
611, 626 n.3 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). The court correctly explained that all of those
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address the evolving interpretation of the Missouri statute since Whitfield
forced Judge Fischer to expressly overrule Whitfield in Wood. Had the issue
been expressly resolved before Wood, Judge Fischer would not have
conducted as thorough a Sixth Amendment analysis.
Furthermore, Judge Stith’s dissent strongly contested the majority’s
interpretation of the Missouri death penalty statute.193 Judge Stith primarily
argued that understanding the third step as solely discretionary – as the
majority did – made the fourth step superfluous.194 Indeed, the fourth step –
which asks the jury to consider all evidence – calls for a discretionary decision
by the jury, and a well-established rule of statutory interpretation is to not
render parts of the statute superfluous. In other words, there was no reason to
include the fourth step after giving the jury the chance to exercise its discretion
in the third step. This approach, however, forgets the purpose behind the third
step.
As previously explained, the Eighth Amendment requires sentencers to
have the opportunity to consider mitigating factors.195 The third step of
Missouri’s statute merely complies with this Eighth Amendment mandate. In
complying with this mandate, the third step provides guided discretion in
sentencing because it gives the sentencer specific factors to consider – the
aggravators already found and the statutorily designated mitigators – but
allows the sentencer discretion in decision-making. This type of guided
discretion was exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court envisioned would be
necessary to comply with its limitations on the selection decision. The fourth
step, on the other hand, provides the sentencer an opportunity to exercise
absolute discretion by requiring the jury to make a decision “under all of the
circumstances.”196 The statute does not limit the sentencer in making the
ultimate decision.
Therefore, the third step is necessary to comply with the Eighth
Amendment, but the question still remains: why allow the sentencer an
opportunity for absolute discretion in the fourth step? Perhaps, the Missouri
General Assembly wanted to allow the sentencer to exercise residual doubt.
Residual doubt is “any remaining or lingering doubt a jury has concerning the
defendant’s guilt despite having been satisfied ‘beyond a reasonable
doubt.’”197 Indeed, Missouri capital defense attorneys have seen the value of
exploiting residual doubt to avoid the death penalty for their clients.198

decisions considered the third step a factual finding, but those decisions failed to
explain why they did so. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 585–86.
193. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 598 (Stith, J. dissenting).
194. Id.
195. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–97 (1976).
196. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2018).
197. Jennifer R. Treadway, ‘Residual Doubt’ in Capital Sentencing: No Doubt It
Is An Appropriate Mitigating Factor, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1992).
198. See, e.g., Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741, 757 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (“At the
motion hearing, defense counsel testified that their main strategy in the penalty phase
was to focus on residual doubt concerning whether Barton was guilty of the crime.
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Furthermore, residual doubt is not a mitigating factor in Missouri’s statute,199
and the U.S. Supreme Court does not require the jury to be instructed on
residual doubt at the penalty phase.200 This may reflect the Missouri General
Assembly’s desire to allow sentencers to consider residual doubt in close
cases while not explicitly directing the sentencer to consider residual doubt
where it may not be applicable. Therefore, because the Eighth Amendment
requires consideration of mitigators and the Missouri General Assembly may
want to allow jurors to consider residual doubt, the third step does not render
the fourth step superfluous or vice-versa.
Finally, the majority in Wood did not engage in statutory interpretation,
but Judge Limbaugh’s dissent in Whitfield did. Judge Limbaugh argued that
the language of the statute indicated the weighing step asked the sentencer to
exercise his or her judgment while the first two steps asked the jury to make
a factual finding.201 The first two steps called for “findings,” whereas the third
step called for a “conclusion.”202 This wording suggests that the third step
asks something fundamentally different from the first two steps.203
Accordingly, the language of the statute provides a convincing argument that
the third step is not a factual finding like the first two.

C. Ending Judge-Imposed Death Sentences
Thus far, this Note has questioned the constitutionality of allowing a
judge to weigh aggravators and mitigators. This of course is based on the U.S.
Supreme Court drawing a distinction between elements of the crime and
sentencing factors – a line that becomes especially muddled in death penalty
cases. Given what is at stake in death penalty cases, it is imperative that there
be no doubt all constitutional protections are met. An easy way to assure this
is to require a jury to sentence a defendant to death and leave open no avenue
for a judge to impose a death sentence on his or her own. This approach is
not without historical support.

Counsel testified that it was their desire to avoid presenting witnesses whose testimony
would have made it more likely that Barton committed the crime.”); see also Williams
v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).
199. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032 (2018).
200. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173–77 (1988).
201. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 277 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (Limbaugh, J.
dissenting).
202. Id. at 278.
203. It should be noted that the Missouri statute did not always refer to the third
step as a conclusion. In fact, the Missouri statute originally called for a “finding” at
step three as well as steps one and two. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (1992) (amended
1993). However, the General Assembly revised the statute in 1993 to refer to the third
step as a conclusion. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (1993). It is not clear what brought
about this change (this was still before Ring). It is also not clear whether the third step
would have been a factual finding under the 1992 statute, but Judge Limbaugh’s
argument for it not being a factual finding would be significantly impaired.
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Indeed, Professor John G. Douglass from the University of Richmond
School of Law noted, “Read in light of history, the constitutional text suggests
that all of the rights we now associate with trial were intended to govern all
of the proceedings that lead to a death sentence.”204 Professor Douglass
arrived at this conclusion based on the unified nature of capital trials during
and after the creation of the Sixth Amendment, where the jury made all
determinations.205 Further, Professor Douglass noted the jury’s special role
“as a form of popular resistance to unpopular laws.”206 Nowhere is this role
for the jury more important than in capital cases, where support for the death
penalty is anything but conclusive.207 Ultimately, an interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment requiring a jury make the determination of life or death is
the most practical solution and is backed by significant historical support.
Still, Missouri may choose to act on its own and revise its death penalty
to only allow a jury to make the ultimate determination of life or death. In
fact, Missouri’s death penalty statute – as well as thirty-eight other states’
death penalty statutes – featured this requirement before Furman.208
Restoring the power to the jury – and only the jury – to make the ultimate
determination of life or death would avoid the appearance of impropriety left
by a judge imposing death despite a jury voting eleven-to-one in favor of life
without parole. If Missouri legislators are concerned with the inevitable
decrease in death sentences that such change may bring about, then they need
only remember the role of the jury “as a form of popular resistance to
unpopular laws.”209

V. CONCLUSION
The Missouri death penalty statute’s weighing step occupies a gray area
between sentencing factor and factual finding. The unique interaction
between the Sixth and Eighth Amendments enhances this complexity.
Despite interpreting the weighing step to be a factual finding in Whitfield, the
Missouri Supreme Court recently overruled this holding in Wood. However,
the Wood decision lacks the necessary statutory interpretation to satisfactorily
end the debate over the Missouri statute. Given the importance of making the

204. See John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at
Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 2023 (2005).
205. See id. at 2022–23.
206. Id. at 2022.
207. J. Baxter Oliphant, Public Support for the Death Penalty Ticks Up, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (June 11, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/06/11/us-support-for-death-penalty-ticks-up-2018/ [perma.cc/S3Z6-EP8R]
(noting that in 2016 only 49% of Americans favored the death penalty and now only
54% favor it).
208. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 758 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring).
209. See Douglass, supra note 204, at 2022.
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correct decision in a death penalty case, legislators would be wise to end
judges’ ability to overturn eleven-to-one jury decisions in favor of life.
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